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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen increased interest in the online pres-
ence of extreme right groups. Although originally composed
of dedicated websites, the online extreme right milieu now
spans multiple networks, including popular social media plat-
forms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Ideally there-
fore, any contemporary analysis of online extreme right activ-
ity requires the consideration of multiple data sources, rather
than being restricted to a single platform. We investigate the
potential for Twitter to act as one possible gateway to com-
munities within the wider online network of the extreme right,
given its facility for the dissemination of content. A strategy
for representing heterogeneous network data with a single ho-
mogeneous network for the purpose of community detection
is presented, where these inherently dynamic communities
are tracked over time. We use this strategy to discover and an-
alyze persistent English and German language extreme right
communities.
Author Keywords
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networks.
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INTRODUCTION
The online presence of the extreme right has come under
greater scrutiny in recent years, particularly given events such
as the Oslo killings by Anders Behring Breivik in July 2011,
Wade Michael Page’s attack on a Sikh temple in Wisconsin
in August 2012 and the uncovering in November 2011 of the
German National Socialist Underground (NSU)’s multi-year
murder campaign. While initially the extreme right relied
upon dedicated websites for the dissemination of their hate
content [7], they have since incorporated the use of social
media platforms for community formation around variants of
extreme right ideology [15]. As Twitter’s facility for the dis-
semination of content has been established [2], our previous
work [27] provided an exploratory analysis of its use by ex-
treme right groups. Here we extend this analysis to investi-
gate its potential to act as one possible gateway to commu-
nities located within the online extreme right milieu, which
spans multiple platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and You-
Tube in addition to other websites. Our analysis is focused
on two case studies, involving the investigation of English
and German language online communities.
We infer network representations of heterogeneous nodes and
edges to capture the relations between four different extreme
right online entities: (a) Twitter accounts, (b) YouTube chan-
nels, (c) Facebook profiles and (d) all other websites. The in-
clusion of such platforms allows us to identify extreme right
communities that would otherwise not be apparent when con-
sidering Twitter data alone. As online extreme right networks
are inherently dynamic, we are also interested in tracking the
evolution of the associated groups over an extended period of
time. Following work by Lehmann et al. [23], we apply the
community finding process to a single network representation
where all node types are treated as peers. When interpreting
the output of the process, the use of heterogeneous data pro-
vides us with a rich insight into the composition of the com-
munities, and serves to differentiate between them.
We initially provide a description of related work on the
online activities of extremist groups, along with discussion
of relevant network analysis methods. The generation of
two data sets using English and German language tweets is
then discussed. Next, we describe the methodology used
to derive network representations and subsequently track de-
tected communities. This is followed by an analysis of se-
lected persistent dynamic communities found in both data
sets, where we discuss the merits of the network represen-
tation and provide characterizations of the membership com-
position in terms of the extent to which they span multiple on-
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line platforms. Finally, the overall conclusions are discussed,
and some suggestions for future work are made.
RELATED WORK
Online Extremism
A number of studies have investigated the online presence
of extreme right groups. An early example is that of
Burris et al. [7], where social network analysis of a white
supremacist website network found evidence of decentral-
ization, with little division along doctrinal lines. Gersten-
feld et al. [14] analyzed the content of various extremist web-
sites, and described the potential for forging a stronger sense
of community between geographically isolated groups. Chau
and Xu [9] studied networks built from users contributing to
hate group and racist blogs. Caiani and Wagemann [8] an-
alyzed the website networks of German and Italian extreme
right groups.
More recent work has included the study of online social me-
dia usage by the extreme right. Bartlett et al. [4] performed
a survey of European populist party and group supporters on
Facebook. Baldauf et al. [3] investigated the use of Facebook
by the German extreme right, exploring the strategies em-
ployed for promoting associated ideology along with the use
of certain themes designed to attract new unsuspecting fol-
lowers, such as stated support for freedom of speech and op-
position to child sex abuse. Goodwin and Ramalingam’s [16]
analysis of the radical right in Europe discussed the impor-
tance of online social media, and separately found a shortage
of research on non-electoral forms of right-wing extremism.
A set of reports commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of
Justice and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue [15] analyzed
the use of social media such as Facebook and YouTube by a
number of European extreme right groups.
These related studies suggest that communities within the on-
line extreme right milieu span multiple networks, which pro-
vides a motivation for the current work to analyze their struc-
ture and temporal persistence, while also investigating the po-
tential for popular social media platforms such as Twitter to
act as gateways to this activity.
Network Analysis
An appropriate network representation is required in order
to analyze the multi-network online activity of the extreme
right. The inference and relevance problems discussed by De
Choudhary et al. [12] are applicable here, where the former
is attributed to the fact that “real” social ties are not directly
observable and must be inferred from observations of events
(in our case, tweets from identified extreme right accounts
on Twitter), while the lack of one “true” social network is
associated with the latter, due to the potential existence of
multiple networks each corresponding to a different defini-
tion of a tie. Separate incompleteness issues also exist given
the nature of the extreme right. These issues are similar to
those encountered by Sparrow [30] and Krebs [20] in their
respective studies of criminal and terrorist networks, where
references are made to the inevitability of missing nodes and
links, the difficulty in deciding who to include and who not
to include, and the dynamic quality of the networks. As our
current work uses Twitter as a starting point for analyzing on-
line extreme right activity, the notion of missing nodes and
links is realized with the unavailability of older tweet data,
relevant Twitter accounts that have been suspended, profiles
that are not publicly accessible and extreme right entities that
do not maintain a presence on Twitter.
Our proposed representation of heterogeneous node types
with a single homogeneous network is also motivated in part
by previous work in cluster analysis and community find-
ing, where nodes with different semantics have been treated
equally during the clustering phase, and subsequently treated
separately to support the interpretation of the resulting clus-
ters. For instance, Dhillon [13] produced a bipartite spectral
embedding of words and documents, which allowed both to
be clustered simultaneously. Lehmann et al. [23] proposed
an extension of the well-known clique percolation method for
community finding to identify communities of nodes in bipar-
tite graphs. The use of multiple node types avoids the loss of
important structural information, which can occur when per-
forming a one-mode projection of a graph.
For the analysis of communities in temporal networks, a va-
riety of approaches have been proposed. Greene et al. [18]
described a general model for tracking communities in dy-
namic networks. Communities are identified on each individ-
ual time step network, which provides a snapshot of the data
at a particular interval. These communities are then matched
together to form timelines, representing long-lived dynamic
communities that exist over multiple successive steps. This
work was extended in [17] to address the problem of clus-
tering dynamic bipartite networks, where a clustering is pro-
duced on a spectral embedding of both types of nodes simul-
taneously at each time step before matching.
DATA
In our previous analysis [27], we collected a number of Twit-
ter data sets, each associated with a particular country, to fa-
cilitate the analysis of contemporary activity by extreme right
groups. One of our findings was the influence of linguistic
proximity on relationships within the detected extreme right
communities, in particular, the use of the English language.
Given this, we merged two of our data sets associated with
the USA and the United Kingdom respectively. This data set,
along with that associated with German extreme right Twitter
accounts, are the starting points for this current work. Both
data sets were extended to include additional accounts that
were identified as relevant, using criteria such as profiles con-
taining extreme right symbols or references to known groups;
follower relationships with known relevant accounts; simi-
lar Facebook profiles/YouTube channels; extreme right media
accounts; a propensity to share links to known extreme right
websites. Similar criteria were employed in earlier studies
[3, 8], and further details can be found in our previous anal-
ysis [27]. In total, 1,267 English language and 430 German
language accounts were identified. Profile data including fol-
lowers, friends, tweets and list memberships were retrieved
for these accounts, as limited by the Twitter API restrictions
effective at the time, between June 2012 and November 2012.
We are interested in the potential for Twitter to act as one
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possible gateway to online extreme right activity through the
dissemination of links to external websites; for example, ded-
icated websites managed by particular groups, content shar-
ing websites such as YouTube, or mainstream websites host-
ing content that could be used to promote associated con-
cerns. Accordingly, the account tweet content is analyzed
to extract all external URLs. YouTube URLs are further pro-
cessed, where profile data is retrieved for any detected video
and channel (account) identifiers. Similarly, profile data is
retrieved for any user, group and page identifiers detected
within Facebook URLs. In both cases, we are restricted to
data that is publicly accessible. We also extract Twitter ac-
count identifiers from any URLs that point to content such
as photos or other images that are hosted directly on Twit-
ter. Regarding interactions within Twitter itself, we extract all
mention and retweet events between the identified accounts.
Statistics of the final data sets used in the analysis can be
found in Table 1.
METHODOLOGY
Network Representation
In this work, we use a single network representation consist-
ing of four node types: (a) Twitter accounts, (b) YouTube
channels, (c) Facebook profiles and (d) other websites, where
we refer to the latter three as external nodes (with respect
to Twitter). Heterogeneous edges are also employed to re-
flect the variety of possible interactions; (a) a Twitter account
mentioning another Twitter account, (b) a Twitter account
retweeting another Twitter account and (c) a Twitter account
linking to an external node through the inclusion of a corre-
sponding URL in a tweet. For the purpose of this analysis, no
distinction is made between mention or retweet events. In a
similar approach to the ingredient complement network used
by Teng et al. [33], we infer edges between external nodes
whose URLs have appeared in tweets from the same Twitter
account, in order to further tackle the issue of data incom-
pleteness. At this point, we filter any YouTube and website
nodes whose URLs have appeared in tweets from a single ac-
count only. As the number of unique profiles found in tweets
containing Facebook URLs tends to be lower, these nodes
are not filtered. We do not filter external nodes that could be
considered as mainstream (for example, newspapers or TV
channels), as we are also interested in references to such enti-
ties by extreme right accounts. All edges are treated as undi-
rected, with raw weights based on the frequency of the edge
event in question. These weights are normalized with the
use of pointwise mutual information (PMI) as suggested by
Teng et al. [33], where we extend this process for heteroge-
neous node pairs (a, b) as follows:
PMI(a,b) = log
(
1 +
p(a, b)
p(a)p(b)
)
For Twitter-Twitter mentions|retweets edges, the PMI is
the probability that two Twitter accounts a and b have a
mention|retweet relationship against the probability that their
respective mentions|retweets are separate:
p(a, b) =
# of mentions|retweets between a and b
# of mentions|retweets
p(a) =
# of mentions|retweets featuring a
# of mentions|retweets
p(b) =
# of mentions|retweets featuring b
# of mentions|retweets
For Twitter-external URL edges, the PMI is the probability
that a URL external entity b has been tweeted by a particular
Twitter account a against the probability that their respective
URL tweet occurrences are separate:
p(a, b) =
# of tweets from a with URL of b
# of tweets with URLs
p(a) =
# of tweets from a with URLs
# of tweets with URLs
p(b) =
# of tweets with URL of b
# of tweets with URLs
For inferred external-external edges, the PMI is the probabil-
ity that two URL external entities a and b have been tweeted
by a particular Twitter account against the probability that
they have been tweeted by separate accounts:
p(a, b) =
# of accounts that tweeted URLs of both a and b
# of accounts that tweeted URLs
p(a) =
# of accounts that tweeted URL of a
# of accounts that tweeted URLs
p(b) =
# of accounts that tweeted URL of b
# of accounts that tweeted URLs
The addition of inferred edges between external nodes can
occasionally lead to dense networks, particularly with the in-
clusion of accounts that are prolific tweeters. As the PMI
weights for these edges tend to be normally distributed, we
filter any such edges with PMI < µ+2σ. All other edges are
retained.
Community Detection
As with our previous analysis [27], we use our variant [19] of
the Lancichinetti and Fortunato consensus clustering method
[21] to generate a set of stable consensus communities from
an inferred network instance, based on 100 runs of the
OSLOM algorithm [22]. As before, we selected a value of
0.5 for the threshold parameter τ used with the consensus
method, as a compromise between node retention and more
stable communities. Although we previously detected com-
munities within a static graph representation, these networks
are inherently dynamic, and so we are interested in the topol-
ogy of these communities over an extended period of time.
Using the method of Greene et al. [18], we represent this dy-
namic network as a set of l time step networks {g1, . . . , gl},
employing a sliding window approach to generate snapshots
of the nodes and edges in the overall network at successive
intervals.
The selection of the sliding window size has a direct impact
on the topology of the generated network snapshots. In their
3
Data set Tweets Mentions Retweets All URLs YouTube URLs Facebook URLs
English language 1,517,339 539,181 162,042 972,444 71,049 23,007
German language 54,873 14,263 11,028 88,309 3,868 6,924
Table 1: Data set statistics for the period of June 1st, 2012 to November 16th, 2012.
discussion of dynamic proximity networks, Clauset and Ea-
gle [10] claim that dynamics are a multi-scale phenomenon,
with variation taking place at several distinct time scales.
However, they also suggest that a natural time scale exists
with which important temporal variation is preserved. In this
analysis, we consider this natural time scale to be related to
the activity of the identified extreme right Twitter accounts.
We calculated the mean percentage of accounts active in each
data set within a series of increasing time scales ranging from
one day up to a duration of eight weeks; a plot of these values
can be seen in Figure 1. Although the accounts in the En-
glish language data set seem to be more active than those of
the German language data set, the relative activity trends are
highly similar. In both cases, there is a sharp increase in the
percentage of active accounts between the daily and weekly
time scales, with a lesser increase between the weekly and
bi-weekly scales. At this point, the rate of increase slows
down, which suggests that using a window size of two weeks
is appropriate for meaningful analysis rather than a larger
size whereby the corresponding snapshot networks become
increasingly static. When using non-overlapping sliding win-
dows, we found that the generated step networks exhibited
a certain amount of volatility, potentially due to data incom-
pleteness or a variance in Twitter usage patterns in different
countries, for example, the use of Twitter tends to be more
prevalent in the UK and the USA than in other countries such
as Germany. We use overlapping sliding windows in an at-
tempt to smooth this volatility, where the overlap is a period
of one week.
Another factor that can influence volatility is related to nodes
that are intermittently present in the step networks. For exam-
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Figure 1: Mean percentage of Twitter accounts active at in-
creasing time scales (1 day up to 8 weeks) for English and
German language data sets, between June 2012 and Novem-
ber 2012.
ple, an offline extreme right event may lead to increased ac-
tivity from certain Twitter accounts or references to external
media nodes. As a dynamic community timeline is created by
matching step communities to existing dynamic communities
over successive steps, we address this issue as follows:
1. Rather than solely relying on the most recent observation
(referred to as the front) in an existing dynamic community
timeline for comparison with the set of step communities
at each step, we consider all historical step communities
in a timeline as comparison candidates. This permits the
consideration of those nodes that are intermittently active.
2. We use a modified version of the Jaccard coefficient for bi-
nary sets to calculate the similarity between a step commu-
nity Cta and a single candidate historical step community
Dtb belonging to an existing dynamic community timeline,
based on the undirected cluster representativeness metric
suggested by Bourqui et al. [6]:
sim(Cta, Dtb) =
√
|Cta ∩Dtb|
|Cta| ×
|Cta ∩Dtb|
|Dtb|
3. The overall similarity of a step community with the en-
tire set of candidate communities belonging to an existing
dynamic community timeline is calculated as an exponen-
tial weighted moving average of the individual similarities,
with a decay factor α = 0.5. A match occurs if the overall
similarity ≥ 0.25. This is in line with the range of thresh-
old values used in the original Greene et al. method evalu-
ation [18].
ANALYSIS
Persistent Dynamic Communities
The method described in the previous section was applied to
our two case study data sets, on data collected from June 1st,
2012 to November 16th, 2012. Using a sliding window length
of two weeks with a one week overlap resulted in twenty-
three time steps. A network representation was derived for
each of these steps, and the dynamic community matching
process was then applied to these step networks. In our anal-
ysis, we are particularly interested in persistent dynamic com-
munities, where a community is defined as persistent if it has
members active in all time steps. The total number of such
dynamic communities found in the English language and Ger-
man language data sets were fifteen and four respectively. We
have selected two persistent communities from each data set
for detailed analysis, and timeline diagrams of the constituent
step communities can be found in Figures 2a and 2b.
From an initial inspection of these timeline diagrams, it can
be seen that these dynamic communities exhibit a certain
amount of volatility, with numerous merge and split life-cycle
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(a) EDL (top) and BNP (bottom) communities, containing an average of 14.9% of the nodes in each step network (σ = 2%)
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(b) German non-electoral (top) and NPD (bottom) communities, containing an average of 50% of the nodes in each step network (σ = 7%)
Figure 2: Timelines of selected persistent dynamic communities for the (a) English and (b) German language datasets, from June
2012 (step t = 1) to mid-November 2012 (step t = 23). Each step corresponds to a two week window, with one week overlaps.
White rectangles indicate that the associated dynamic community was not matched in the corresponding step.
events occurring. As in [18], a merge occurs if multiple exist-
ing dynamic communities are matched to a single step com-
munity at time t. A split occurs if a single dynamic commu-
nity is matched to multiple step communities at time t. On
occasion, we have found that an existing dynamic commu-
nity may be a candidate for both a merge and a split event at
a particular time t. In this scenario, we give precedence to
merge events and a new dynamic community is created for
the step community that generates the split. Both timeline
diagrams also include branches of step communities that are
distinct upon initial creation, but become merged in a subse-
quent step.
An analysis of the nodes in the first English language com-
munity in Figure 2a shows that it is associated with the En-
glish Defence League (EDL), a street protest movement op-
posed to the alleged spread of radical Islamism within the
UK. This community also contains nodes associated with the
British Freedom party, a splinter group from the British Na-
tional Party (BNP) that formed an alliance with the EDL in
2012 [16, 25]. We observe the presence of Casuals United, a
protest group formed from an alliance of football hooligans,
also linked with the EDL. The second English language com-
munity is primarily associated with the BNP, with nodes from
other groups such as Combined ex-Forces (CxF), Infidels and
The British Resistance also present [15]. Other notable per-
sistent dynamic communities from this data set include two
white power/national socialist communities largely consist-
ing of North American and South African nodes respectively.
The first of the selected German language communities
shown in Figure 2b appears to be associated with a vari-
ety of non-electoral groups. These include außerparlamen-
tarischer Widerstand (non-parliamentary resistance) entities,
Freies Netz (neo-Nazi collectives), along with various “in-
formation/news portals” [26]. Two organizations banned by
the German authorities in 2012, namely Spreelichter [29]
and Besseres Hannover [32], are also present. The second
German language community is electoral in nature, asso-
ciated with the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(National Democratic Party of Germany - NPD), and in-
cludes nodes representing regional NPD offices and individ-
ual politicians. Although this community appears to be as-
sociated with regions across Germany, a smaller persistent
NPD community, localized to the federal state of Thu¨ringen
can also be observed. This smaller community contains a
mixture of electoral (NPD) and non-electoral nodes.
Community Structure
In this section, we discuss the merits of using a single network
representation of heterogeneous node types in our analysis of
extreme right communities. As the online presence of these
groups extends beyond individual networks such as Twitter
or Facebook, the proposed representation permits the struc-
ture of these wider communities to be revealed, which would
otherwise not be evident if analysis was restricted to a single
network.
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(a) All nodes (b) Twitter nodes
Figure 3: BNP community. Filtering results in central node
loss and disconnection (grey=Twitter, blue=Facebook, or-
ange=YouTube, red=other websites).
We illustrate this by visualizing individual step communi-
ties belonging to the persistent dynamic communities selected
from the data sets, as described in the previous section. Net-
work diagrams of these communities were created with Gephi
[5], using the Yifan Hu layout. Figure 3 contains diagrams for
a BNP step community, with Figure 3a presenting the com-
munity with all nodes, while non-Twitter nodes have been
filtered in Figure 3b (42% of nodes and 28% of edges are re-
tained), resulting in the loss of important central nodes such
as the official BNP website and YouTube channel. The con-
trast between Figures 3a and 3b illustrates the important link-
ing role played by non-Twitter nodes, as the observable net-
work is disconnected when they are not considered. In ad-
dition, the use of heterogeneous nodes enables us to imme-
diately identify this community as being associated with the
BNP. Similar diagrams for an EDL step community can be
seen in Figure 4, with 66% of nodes and 56% of edges re-
tained with filtering (Figure 4b). Although disconnection is
not introduced, it nevertheless results in the loss of central
nodes such as the official EDL and British Freedom websites.
We also present examples from the selected German language
(a) All nodes (b) Twitter nodes
Figure 4: EDL community. Filtering results in central
node loss (grey=Twitter, blue=Facebook, orange=YouTube,
red=other websites).
(a) All nodes (b) Twitter nodes
Figure 5: German non-electoral community. Filtering re-
sults in central node loss (grey=Twitter, orange=YouTube,
red=other websites).
communities. The filtering of the non-electoral community in
Figure 5 (58% of nodes and 46% of edges are retained) pro-
duces a similar effect to that of the EDL community, where
important central nodes such as the Besseres Hannover web-
site and those associated with other relevant information por-
tals are removed. Our last example in Figure 6 demonstrates
the potential for severe loss of community structure when
filtering is applied (32% of nodes and 3% of edges are re-
tained). In this example, although there is almost no com-
munication (in terms of mentions and retweets) between the
Twitter nodes, they are considered members of the same com-
munity within the wider network.
(a) All nodes (b) Twitter nodes
Figure 6: NPD community. Filtering results in central node
loss and disconnection (grey=Twitter, blue=Facebook, or-
ange=YouTube, red=other websites).
Community Characterization
We now provide a characterization of the selected persis-
tent dynamic communities shown in Figure 2, with a detailed
analysis of the member nodes; in particular, those associated
with external (non-Twitter) websites. Due to the sensitivity of
the subject matter, and in the interests of privacy, individual
accounts and profiles from networks such as Twitter, Face-
book and YouTube are not explicitly identified. Instead, we
restrict discussion to known extreme right groups and their
6
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Figure 7: EDL community characterization, based on two al-
ternative rankings of website nodes.
affiliates. For each of the selected communities, we pro-
vide two alternative top ten rankings of the website nodes;
the first ranks the nodes in terms of their frequency of step
membership, while the second ranks them in terms of their
total degree across all steps, normalized with respect to the
total number of steps. In both cases, the membership rank-
ing distribution tends to be positively skewed, with a set of
core community members assigned in the majority of steps,
accompanied by a larger set of peripheral members who were
assigned intermittently.
Figure 7 presents the two rankings of website nodes for the
EDL community. As might be expected, the frequency rank-
ing includes the official EDL and British Freedom websites.
Other websites and blogs affiliated with the EDL are also
present, including a Casuals United blog. Of similar inter-
est is a blog that appears to be a mocking reference to the
established anti-extremist organization, HOPE not hate. The
degree ranking produces broadly similar results, with notable
exceptions being the appearance of mainstream media web-
sites. An analysis of the original URLs finds them to be as-
sociated with populist newspaper articles on topics such as
the existence of UK sex grooming gangs, Muslim integration,
and immigration in general. Separate studies have found in-
terest in these topics by other extreme right groups [3], and
it would appear that mainstream media may unwittingly play
a role in the occasional promotion of material that coincides
with extreme right ideology. Other articles that are interpreted
as perceived media persecution of groups such as the EDL
are also promoted. Looking at the non-website nodes, official
EDL Twitter and Facebook accounts can be observed, along
with those purporting to be affiliates. Similar YouTube chan-
nels are also present, including a British Freedom channel
courtnewsuk.co.uk
traitor666.blogspot.co.uk
nickgriffinmep.eu
scoop.it
thebritishresistance.co.uk
davidicke.com
paper.li/ScotBNP
campaigns.bnp.org.uk
simondarby.net
bnp.org.uk
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(a) Membership frequency
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menmedia.co.uk
campaigns.bnp.org.uk
thebritishresistance.co.uk
bnp.org.uk
0 5 10 15 20
(b) Normalized degree
Figure 8: BNP community characterization, based on two al-
ternative rankings of website nodes.
that was suspended in late 2012 (this has since been replaced
with a new channel according to their website).
We find similar membership composition in the BNP com-
munity, where the website rankings are presented in Fig-
ure 8. The frequency ranking highlights websites associated
with the BNP and that of its current leader, Nick Griffin. As
mentioned in an earlier section, this community also contains
members associated with The British Resistance, a white na-
tionalist group whose website banner contains the 14-word
slogan coined by the American white supremacist David Lane
(“We must secure the existence of our people and a future for
White Children”). As with the EDL community, mainstream
media websites appear in the degree ranking, where the cor-
responding article topics are similar to those promoted by the
EDL. The presence of additional groups such as Combined
ex-Forces (CxF) and the Infidels can be found when the Twit-
ter and Facebook nodes are inspected. The latter group orig-
inally splintered from the EDL, and although it has a minor
presence within the EDL community, it would seem that the
BNP’s efforts to court this group [24] may partly explain its
more significant role in this community. The most prominent
YouTube node is the official BNP channel, with other chan-
nels of a nationalist nature appearing sporadically.
In the case of the German language website rankings, Fig-
ure 9 shows blogs and websites from a variety of disparate
groups for the non-electoral community. The majority of
these are associated with known non-electoral groups, al-
though mainstream media websites are also present. An anal-
ysis of the associated articles demonstrates once again the
promotion of perceived persecution, for example, the ban-
ning of the Spreelichter and Besseres Hannover groups fea-
tures heavily here. We also see a connection to electoral
7
widerstand.info
ruhrnachrichten.de
besseres−hannover.info
senftenberger.blogspot.com
mupinfo.de
altermedia−deutschland.info
freies−netz−sued.net
pinselstriche.org
infoportal−schwaben.net
identitaet.tumblr.com
0 5 10 15 20 25
(a) Membership frequency
infoportal−schwaben.net
senftenberger.blogspot.com
freies−netz−sued.net
spiegel.de
pinselstriche.org
mupinfo.de
altermedia−deutschland.info
widerstand.info
identitaet.tumblr.com
besseres−hannover.info
0 2 4 6 8 10
(b) Normalized degree
Figure 9: German non-electoral community characterization,
based on two alternative rankings of website nodes.
groups with the appearance of the NPD-affiliated MUPInfo
website. Further connections to the NPD are visible as var-
ious NPD Facebook page nodes are also intermittent mem-
bers of this community. A notable temporary Facebook mem-
ber node was a page (no longer available) encouraging “sol-
idarity” with Nadja Drygalla, a member of the 2012 German
Olympic rowing team who left the tournament early due to
the neo-Nazi connections of her boyfriend, who was a for-
mer NPD election candidate [31]. The website rankings for
the NPD community in Figure 10 are primarily composed
of NPD-affiliated websites, with a minor number of main-
stream websites also appearing for the same reasons as be-
fore. Both communities feature a moderate YouTube pres-
ence, with nodes such as NPD channels, music channels and
individual channels featuring videos of demonstrations, in-
cluding some of the Unsterblichen (immortals) marches that
were orchestrated by Spreelichter [3, 29].
Twitter Activity and External Events
We also perform a brief inspection of community Twitter
activity, providing examples for a single persistent dynamic
community from both data sets. Based on knowledge of ex-
ternal offline events associated with these communities, we
generate three month plots of the daily total tweet counts
for (a) the accounts assigned in the corresponding two-week
step community and (b) the remaining accounts in the data
set, where the raw counts are z-score normalized. In both
cases, we find that peaks in tweeting activity by the commu-
nity accounts may be associated with external events. For
example, the EDL activity plot in Figure 11a highlights in-
creased activity around the times of street demonstrations,
with other events such as the anniversary of the July 7th, 2005
London bombings being of particular interest to this com-
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Figure 10: NPD community characterization, based on two
alternative rankings of website nodes.
munity. Although the German non-electoral community plot
in Figure 11b also contains raised activity for a demonstra-
tion, other events such as the Besseres Hannover ban (ini-
tially banned by the German authorities [32]; their account
was subsequently blocked by Twitter within Germany [11])
have a similar impact. These peaks may introduce temporary
community members, for example, a file-sharing site contain-
ing an archive of the besseres-hannover.info website appears
for a number of days at the time of the initial ban.
Summary Discussion
In general, the membership composition of the selected com-
munities would appear to broadly correspond with contem-
porary knowledge of these groups; for example, the distinc-
tion between the EDL and the BNP [24]. To a certain ex-
tent, we also see divisions according to the four-fold typology
suggested by Goodwin et al. [16], where these communities
could be characterized by three of the four types; organized
political parties (BNP, NPD), grassroots social movements
(EDL) and smaller groups (German non-electoral). How-
ever, it could also be suggested that some overlap between
these types can occur, for example, the presence of the Infi-
dels and British Resistance in the BNP community, or NPD-
affiliated nodes in the German non-electoral community. In
addition, the finding of Bartlett et al. [4] that online support-
ers of groups such as the EDL are more likely to demonstrate
than the national average may partly explain the increased
levels of community Twitter activity at the time of external
protests.
We also note the use of official Facebook profiles and You-
Tube channels by electoral parties and grassroots movements
in addition to those maintained by related individuals, while
general blogging websites (often hosted in other countries)
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Figure 11: Tweet activity plots of communities, produced via z-score normalization of tweet counts, for selected time periods.
appear popular with most groups. Separately, all groups
appear to selectively reference mainstream media, directing
traffic to material that coincides with associated ideology. At
this point, we also emphasize that the network representations
used in this analysis do not provide coverage of all online
extreme right activity. As mentioned earlier, data collection
from Twitter, YouTube and Facebook was restricted to pub-
licly accessible content. Given existing knowledge of the use
of online platforms such as Facebook by the extreme right [3,
15], a certain level of incompleteness is to be expected. In
addition, the fact that we use Twitter to infer structure within
the wider online network of the extreme right may also intro-
duce incompleteness, where the network representations are
dependent on the initial identification of relevant profiles.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The online activity of extreme right groups has progressed
from the use of dedicated websites to span multiple networks,
including popular social media platforms such as Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube. As its role in the general dissem-
ination of content has previously been established, we have
investigated the potential for Twitter to act as one possible
gateway to communities located within this wider network.
By representing relations between the heterogeneous network
entities with a single homogeneous network, we are able to
identify extreme right communities that would otherwise not
be evident when considering a single online network alone.
The use of heterogeneous data provides us with a rich insight
into the composition of the resulting communities. Our anal-
ysis has focused on the investigation of English and German
language communities using two separate data sets, where
we have tracked community evolution in these inherently dy-
namic networks over an extended period of time. Two persis-
tent communities found in each of the data sets were selected
for detailed analysis. We have discussed the impact of hetero-
geneous nodes on community topology, and used these nodes
to provide community characterizations, particularly in terms
of the extent to which these communities span multiple online
platforms.
In our dynamic community analysis of both data sets, we have
found that the individual step networks tended to exhibit a
considerable level of volatility. Although this may be due in
part to data incompleteness, it is possible that such volatility
may simply be a feature of the online extreme right presence.
It is likely that this corresponds to factors such as the contin-
ual emergence of new groups [25], while events such as the
jailing of the EDL’s Tommy Robinson [28] or a potential ban
of the NPD [1] are also likely to impact volatility. We would
like to address this issue in future work, which may involve
an extension of the process currently used to track dynamic
communities. In addition, it would be worthwhile to inves-
tigate the potential for other social media platforms such as
Facebook to act as gateways to online extreme right activity,
where a comparison could be made with the current results.
This should also help to address the issue of data incomplete-
ness.
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